



Settler colonial violence in the American Southwest and German Southwest Africa

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ABSTRACT

This article takes a comparative approach to settler colonial violence in the American Southwest and German Southwest Africa. The Anglo invasion of central Arizona in 1864 and the German conflict against the Herero in 1904 highlights the nature of frontier violence and identifies similarities and differences across two points in space and time that have seldom been compared by historians. Those writing of the US-Apache conflicts have failed to look to colonial theaters around the world, their transnational attention focusing instead on the borderlands of United States, Mexico, and independent Indians. Similarly, research on the violence in GSWA has not engaged systematically with international parallels and has instead focused on identifying possible links between GSWA and the Nazis and the Holocaust. This article seeks to address these shortcomings by analysing the comparative strands of settler colonial violence.

KEYWORDS

Apache, Arizona, German Southwest Africa, Herero, Yavapais, Settler Colonialism, Settler Colonial Violence

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Introduction

On August 28, 1864, King Woolsey, a noted local rancher and prospector, wrote to the Governor of Arizona Territory to report on a punitive expedition he was leading in central Arizona. In it he noted that he was confident there were many Indians in the vicinity and that he and 36 volunteers had “determined to hunt them” (*Arizona Miner*, September 7, 1864). They searched the north side of the Salt River in response to the theft of livestock by Yavapais and Apaches angered by the disruption of their economies by settler encroachment on their lands. The expedition did not, however, seek out the specific Indians who had stolen Woolsey’s cattle. Instead, they killed any Western Apache and Yavapai they could locate – man, woman, or child. This reflected more than a desire to mete out punishment. It was in fact part of a broader desire to destroy an entire people whose very existence was enough to draw settler fury.¹ Woolsey had in fact already conducted several such one-sided onslaughts in early 1864, often with devastating cost for the Apaches and Yavapais.² For many settlers, Woolsey, originally from Alabama, was an energetic and respected member of the growing white settler community. He was also a merciless killer, who deceived and slayed defenseless Apaches and Yavapais during ‘friendly’ talks, used strychnine to poison them, ambushed their sleeping villages, and advocated the killing of women and children (Lahti, 2017). Woolsey was both an advocate and participant in the violence. On one occasion, he killed an Apache, hung the corpse to a tree, and left it dangling along a busy travel route. There the scorched body remained and for months served as a menacing and grim welcome for all travelers (Browne, 1869).

This violence was not simply a response to stock raiding. Woolsey’s aim was to destroy the Indigenous Apaches and Yavapais to allow unfettered access to their lands. The very existence of the Yavapais and Apaches was enough to challenge this vision, fuel settler anxieties, and seemingly justify their extermination. Woolsey’s response blended vigilantism, massacre, and treachery with more organised punitive expeditions during which he did not discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. It was, as Woolsey conceived it, a war of annihilation, one which necessitated the targeting of both people and their material base.

The experience of the Yavapais and Apaches was far from being an anomaly for there were numerous other instances where violence erupted as settler societies sought to remove or exterminate indigenous populations. For example, in German Southwest Africa (GSWA) the Hereros, angered by continued intrusions on their land, stormed settler ranches in January 1904. Among those facing the Herero resistance was Silesian Victor Franke. An experienced German officer, he had served in GSWA since 1896, and was a competent and respected member of the settler community, much like Woolsey. He was religious, practical, and considered relatively humane. Yet he too was a ruthless killer who had gained a measure of fame by squashing the Herero at Omaruru in early February 1904. His diary at the time contained stories of killings of the wounded and unwounded, of the armed and unarmed. Franke openly described how a Herero prisoner “is questioned and then ... shot from the back at a moment when the unfortunate man suspected nothing” (Franke, 27 February 1904). Later that year Franke took part in the Battle of Waterberg and in the subsequent merciless pursuit of Herero survivors into the Omaheke Desert. Destitute Herero men, women, and children who sought to surrender to escape from hunger and lack of water were summarily shot or executed. One eyewitness described how the Germans killed “women and children along the roadsides. They bayoneted them and hit them to death ... words cannot be found to relate what happened; it was too terrible” (Gewald & Silvester, 2003, p. 117). Even Franke grew disgusted by the widespread killing of captured women and children (Franke, 12 and 20 August 1904; Hull, 2006, pp. 47-48).

Colonial violence in the American Southwest and in German Southwest Africa have seldom been compared by historians. Those writing of the US-Apache conflicts have failed to look to colonial theaters around the world, their transnational attention focusing instead on the borderlands of United States, Mexico, and independent Indians. The studies of the generations-long struggle between Indigenous powers, the Spanish Empire, Mexico, and the US for mastery of the current US-Mexico border area have usually stressed Indigenous resistance and their unique

military cultures. Violence in the Southwest borderlands of North America was perpetrated by state and state-sanctioned forces, Indigenous polities, corporate mercenaries, and private people and ranged from individual acts of murder to mob lynching and ultimately, genocide. This violence was understood as both a destructive energy and a constructive tool integral to building often ambiguous identities as settlers (See Barr, 2007; Blyth, 2012; DeLay, 2008; Hämäläinen, 2008; Jacoby, 2008; Lahti, 2017; Zappia, 2014).

Similarly, research on the violence in GSWA has not engaged systematically with international parallels. Rather, scholars have focused on identifying a specific German military culture and tracking specifically German forms of extreme violence (Hull, 2006). In addition, there has been an understandable though limiting focus on identifying possible links between GSWA and the Nazis and the Holocaust (See Fitzpatrick, 2008, pp. 477-503; Madley, 2005, pp. 429-464; Zimmerer, 2011; 2004). Others have stressed the local aspects, the conditions on the ground, the environment, and particular circumstances in determining the genesis and shapes of violence in GSWA (Kuss, 2017). Still others have emphasised racism and emotionality in a campaign marked by failure and frustration in which shame and fear fueled the escalation of violence on the part of the Germans (Häussler, 2021). This article seeks to address these shortcomings by analysing the comparative strands of settler colonial violence in the Anglo invasion of central Arizona in 1864 and the German conflict against the Herero in 1904. These episodes showcase the intensities and trajectories of violence at two points in space and time when the momentum of settler colonialism drove the acquisition of territory and the dispossession and murder of indigenous peoples.

Furthermore, these episodes are pertinent for understanding colonial durabilities in our present time. In fact, both show how colonial violence and its wounds remain relevant today. Namibia and Germany have engaged in negotiations over the Herero genocide since 2015. This has featured calls for repatriation of human remains the Germans took for scientific research during the violence. It has also witnessed calls for formal apologies and monetary compensation, and for recognition and healing of past wounds. While some initiatives have been taken, much still remains unsettled (Lahti, 2022). In North America, the discussion around colonial violence has recently resurfaced in relation to Indigenous boarding schools and their burial grounds. But the onslaught the Western Apaches and Yavapais faced in the 1860s has gone largely unnoticed. Yet, important questions remain to be asked about genocide and the nature of US-Indigenous conflicts of the 1800s, and there is a need for detailed case studies of colonial violence and their unsettled legacies (Madley, 2015; Madley, 2016; Ostler, 2016).

Peripheral settler destinations

Neither Arizona nor GSWA were particularly dynamic settler colonial sites on a global scale. Their subjugation was rather tentative, uncertain, and gradual; far removed from James Belich's conception of a "settler revolution" characterised by supercharged, exponential growth in places such as California, Texas, or Australia (Belich, 2011, p. 9). While hundreds of thousands of settlers travelled to these destinations in a short span of time, and tens of thousands ventured to South Africa or Algeria, only a small trickle found themselves in Arizona or Namibia. But there was an identifiable increase in settler activity in these areas, and in both places, it was tied to violence.

Driven by the belief that white settlers were destined to dominate the continent, the US removed the lands stretching from Texas to the Pacific Ocean from nominal Mexican rule relatively easily in a short and aggressive war in 1846-1848. Yet asserting US rule on the ground and nationalising the large territory wrested from Mexico proved much harder and led to many prolonged conflicts, nowhere more so than in Arizona. As the 1860s dawned, Arizona's non-Indigenous population stood at a meager 6,000 people, of whom many were Hispanics. By way of contrast, in 1860, California had a population of 370,000 people, Texas over 600,000, and New Mexico 93,000 (US Census Office, 1872). Dominated by parched deserts, elevated plateaus, limited rainfall, and rugged mountain ranges, Arizona was an uninviting destination for white settlers. Its interior could not be reached through navigable rivers, its roads were few, and the railroads did not cross it until the early 1880s. In addition to being sparsely populated, the area also felt foreign

to white settlers due to a long Spanish presence and the omnipresence of several independent Indigenous communities, including the loosely connected cells of Yavapais and different Apache bands, clans, and families. While they did not recognise US sovereignty over them, they were also not the villainous raiders that dominated the settlers' fears. In fact, their economy relied on hunting, gathering of wild plants, and farming of corn, pumpkins, and other crops along streams in the deep valleys that cut their high timbered ranges (Record, 2008).³

Acquired as a protectorate in 1884, the German sphere of influence in Southwest Africa rested on a series of protection treaties with local Indigenous communities, and gradually advanced inland from the coastal area. Within this massive landmass, flanked by the Namib and Kalahari deserts in the west and east, the central highland plateau was potentially useful for cattle ranching and possibly some farming with irrigation (Jones, 2021). And while many in Germany wanted to divert the emigrant flows from the Americas to Germany's own colonies, they saw GSWA as the only even remotely suitable place for that purpose. In addition, the plateau was a highly contested ground between the pastoralist Herero and the Nama to their south. The German presence remained weak, with few traders, some missionaries, and limited government presence in the form of an imperial commissioner (governor after 1898) and a handful of soldiers. In all, only around 2,500 Germans had settled in GSWA by 1902 (Häussler, 2021; Leanza, 2020; Drechsler, 1980).

Despite the limitations of their newly won territory, neither Germany nor the US seriously contemplated giving up. Instead, in both places the potential of the land for extractive industries and permanent white societies supported by mining, ranching, farming, town building, and railroad construction appeared attractive possibilities. In both places, however, Indigenous communities stood in their way. In Arizona, a mining rush was a catalyst for an expanded frontier conflict. In GSWA, it was an Indigenous uprising.

Punishment

In April 1863, Joseph R. Walker's party found gold in the San Francisco Mountains of central Arizona, a Yavapai-Western Apache homeland formerly free of settlers. As news spread across the US, it led to a rush of white prospectors. Many of them were Californians, actual 49ers, their offspring, or admirers thirsting for new bonanzas and used to confronting Indigenous peoples (Madley, 2016). In 1864 Arizona was established as a territory distinct from New Mexico. Prescott was made the new territorial capital and Fort Whipple became a base for US troops, with both situated at the center of Yavapai-Western Apache country. What nonviolent accord there existed at the time the Walker party first arrived evaporated by the year's end as settlers quickly outnumbered Yavapais and Apaches around Prescott. In settler rhetoric, these Indigenous groups constituted a serious threat as wild raiders and murderers who had to be eradicated. The local paper articulated the settler outlook on May 25, 1864, when one writer observed that: "We favor the extermination policy or the complete overthrow of their power." Advocating the destruction of an entire society, this writer was careful to point out the higher aims, as he saw them. Killing will not be done "for thirst for blood" but for the sake of "peace and prosperity of the country" (*Arizona Miner*, May 25, 1864). Violence was thereby positioned as an integral feature of white settlement.

While neither the Yavapais nor the Western Apaches had engaged in any kind of systematic armed resistance, white settlers believed themselves to be under siege and at the mercy of marauding savages who prevented access to the land. In a letter sent from Fort Whipple in February 1864, Joseph Allyn observed how "repeated depredations" by the Indians had "thoroughly aroused the animosity of the settlers that a war of extermination has in fact already begun." Now, "Indians are shot wherever seen." He also added that "perhaps" extermination is "the only way to deal with Indians, at any rate settlers seem to think so." In any case, once extermination began, it was "too late to go back" (Nicholson, 1974, p. 68).

The Hereros were likewise confronted by an increase in settler encroachment on their lands. By the turn of the century many Herero leaders had already sold parts of their lands, mainly to cover the losses caused by the Rinderpest cattle fever epidemic of the 1890s. Recognising that nothing would satisfy the German appetite for land and tiring of German harassment, bullying, and killings, the Hereros revolted in January 1904 at Okahandja. It was very much a local uprising, a limited affair, which the Germans turned into a general conflict (Gewald, 1999). Until this time, German efforts had been marred by self-doubts and frustrations arising from their inability to impose their will on the indigenous population. Stories, often false, of white settlers being killed, mutilated, and raped, and of an impending settler annihilation only fueled settler fear (General Staff, 1907). Soon reinforcements began to arrive from Germany, so many in fact that soldiers outnumbered the settlers. In GSWA, settler violence began with punitive expeditions, not unlike those Woolsey and his settlers conducted in Arizona forty years earlier. Punishment was designed to emphasise the futility of resistance. As Lieutenant Otto Eggers observed, “All those familiar with the land are of the view that colonisation is impossible without teaching those impudent Hereros a lesson they are not likely to forget” (Kuss, 2017, p. 162). From the earliest days of the war, violence was deemed necessary, perhaps even desirable.

What constituted punishment in GSWA and Arizona was wholesale killing. Writing in May 1904, Governor Theodore Leutwein (1904) made it known to his superiors that in the field “nonwounded Herero have not been taken at all” and only few wounded had been captured before being court-martialed and executed (p. 68). One German account described the capture of a “number of the murderers” who were then “sentenced to death by hanging and hung from the nearest tree as a warning example” (Auer, 1911, p. 46). Another eyewitness recalled how a German unit had met two “very old” Herero women warming themselves at a fire. One of the soldiers dismounted, walked to the women, and shot them (Gewald & Silvester, 2003, p. 115). In Arizona, the methods were much the same. When settlers found any Apaches or Yavapais, they killed them indiscriminately, poisoned food supplies, summarily executed prisoners, and robbed and mutilated, spreading terror as they went.⁴ One witness noted how settlers looked on “full of satisfaction” as “the skull and brains” of wounded Apaches – men, women, and children, even small babies – were smashed “to smithereens” with large rocks. One of the settlers in this group also shot and scalped an elderly “gray-headed” Apache “squaw” (Conner, 1956, pp. 219-221; p. 232).

One of the things that set individual settlers and soldiers apart was the question of killing women and children. Franke was disgusted by the practice, Woolsey openly embraced it, while generals James Carleton, commanding US Army in Arizona, and Lothar von Trotha, in charge of German troops, went out of their way to forbid the practice. In his correspondence with Carleton, Woolsey admitted that they would have killed even more women during a punitive campaign if they could have just found them. Woolsey’s stance was brutally simple. He would kill any Apache and Yavapai he could, stating that “For my part I am frank to say that I fight on the broad platform of extermination” (King Woolsey to Gen. James Carleton, March 29, 1864, quoted in Jacoby, 2008, p. 116). Carleton, like most regular US Army officers, was a moral conservative guided by a strict sense of honor, and thus did not share Woolsey’s mentality. He instead insisted in his orders that while it was morally acceptable to slay Indigenous men at first sight, women and children should not be killed deliberately but be allowed to surrender unharmed.⁵ In GSWA, Trotha wanted no prisoners, but made it clear that Herero women and children should be driven back but they should not be killed intentionally. Yet, as Isabel Hull (2006) observes, “because killing of women and children was one of the strongest taboos operating in modern armies, an order explicitly forbidding it would only be necessary if the taboo had already been massively broken” (p. 49).

In Arizona, Yavapais and Western Apaches avoided contact with settler outfits and retreated into the high mountain ranges hoping their enemies would struggle to locate them. By mid-1864 they needed to abandon their usual camp locations, and farming sites, as well as cease random livestock raiding. They simply went hungry and hoped the settlers would not find them. In GSWA the odds were much more even, at first. Germans seemed to be on the receiving end in most of the major skirmishes between combatants. The Hereros could field sizable armies numbering in the

thousands and they were ready to fight, unlike the small cells of Yavapais and Apaches who were wholly unprepared for sustained warfare. Ambushed by the Herero at Klein Barmen in March 1904, one German soldier wrote how it was “impossible for us to retreat” as his outfit was being fired on from two sides. Anguished, he continued that “just then the black devils came running from the entire length of the mountains like a swarm of ants.” After seven hours of confusion and chaos, the firing finally stopped. It had been a terrible day for this German unit. “I cannot describe how we felt. Our little mounted company of thirty men had paid the price today. Five men dead; two men wounded” (Mansfield, 2017, pp. 64-67).

Yet setbacks like these only further fueled German fears and resentment. But no German victories emerged during the Spring campaigns. And yet, like Jan-Bart Gewald suggests, the Herero were holding back. They were not prepared for all-out war but sought diplomatic solutions. Between mid-April and August, they did nothing. They undertook no offensive actions, and they did not sabotage German telegraph lines, or over-extended supply lines. Instead, they expected negotiations with the Germans, and withdrew northward towards Waterberg Mountain (Gewald, 1999). The Germans were not, however, interested in negotiating. Berlin forbade Leutwein from seeking a negotiated solution before replacing him with General Lothar von Trotha, who they tasked with crushing the Hereros

Annihilation

Assuming command of the military operations from Governor Leutwein, Trotha pushed for a standing battle, thinking it would break the Herero resistance. Trotha had his battle at Waterberg on August 11, 1904, but it was not the kind of crushing victory he had expected. Disappointed, Trotha’s next step called for forced deportation pursued through relentless chase and annihilation (Drechsler, 1980). German troops were to drive the Herero into the Omaheke Desert so that “they must forever leave the land,” Trotha reasoned. Any who showed up in areas controlled by the Germans “with, or without a gun...will be shot.” Trotha intended that such a policy would ensure that the Herero “nation as such should be annihilated, or, if this is not possible ... expelled from the country.” As German troops pushed forward, they would meet and destroy the Herero “gradually,” group by group (Trotha quoted in Gewald, 1999, pp. 172-173). As one eyewitness observed after Waterberg, all Hereros found by the Germans “were killed without mercy” (Gewald & Silvester, 2003, p. 115). Those who avoided that fate found themselves bereft of livestock and cornered by German patrols occupying waterholes and key passageways to the south. While Trotha continued to seek battle, the Herero forces were in such desperate condition that they did anything to avoid the Germans, retreating deeper into the desert, seeking to slip across German lines, or attempt to reach the British territories. Their resistance had evaporated and most just wanted shelter, food, and water. Many wanted to surrender, but instead the Germans drove Herero women and children back into the desert. As one German officer observed, the “great majority perished” when “driven to the sand” of the Omaheke (von Estorff & Kutscher, 1968, p. 117).

Surrender was likewise impossible in Arizona. In settler minds there was no space for the Yavapais and Apaches in the new order. It would not be until the early 1870s that President U.S. Grant’s *peace policy* provided the Apaches and Yavapais with a reservation in Arizona. But in 1864, after crushing punitive campaigns, the US Army was experimenting with other forms of extreme violence. It was planning for a massive, coordinated offensive combined with removal, a form of total annihilation that would destroy the Indigenous material base and the environment they depended on. General James Carleton, commanding the California Volunteers, a Union force securing the Southwest against Confederate threat in the Civil War, turned his focus on the Indigenous peoples soon after reaching the borderlands in Summer of 1862. Carleton’s command had overpowered the Mescalero Apaches in New Mexico in 1862-63 and Navajos in northern Arizona the next winter, killing people and livestock and destroying dwellings, crops, and goods. In 1864 Carleton made plans for the forced removal of the Apaches and Yavapais to a distant reservation at Bosque Redondo in eastern New Mexico, on the edge of the Great Plains, where he

was already gathering the surviving Mescaleros and Navajos. In his own words, the goal was the “utter extermination” of Western Apaches in an all-out war so that he could ensure “a lasting peace and security of life to all those who go” to Apache lands “to search for the precious metals.” His methods, outlined in the General Orders dated May 1, 1864, pressed for “a serious war; not a little march out and back again” – the latter Carleton saw as typical of punitive operations – that would bring “lasting results” against the Apache “bands of ruthless murderers.” Carleton continued that every settler who had a rifle must take the field to aid the California soldiers. The troops would execute a massive pincer movement, encircling and squeezing Apaches and Yavapai homelands, from Tucson and Prescott, and from several army posts all the way from New Mexico. Thousands of soldiers and residents would start the war on May 25, 1864 and persist in the field for at least sixty days. Carleton demanded that each unit “strive to outdo all the others” in “energy, perseverance, resolution, and self-denial.” In doing so, the Apaches would comprehend they cannot “hold out against us.” All Apache men large enough to bear arms would “be slain wherever met,” while the enemy food supply and material belongings would be ruthlessly destroyed.⁶ However, Carleton’s plans never materialised, as he lacked the resources and the manpower. Punitive campaigns, however, wreaked havoc for years to come.

Conclusion

By 1875 all Yavapais or Western Apaches still alive had been forced to reservations. 1864 had proved to be a turning point. Before that Yavapai and Western Apache families could usually sleep through the nights peacefully, plan and organise ceremonies, farm, and gather wild plants when they were in season, and find game to hunt in their mountains; thereafter, they were hunted and killed relentlessly, retreating higher into their mountains, scrambling for safety. After 1865 they were easy prey for settler outfits and the US Army units who targeted them for total annihilation. Violence had ‘opened’ Yavapai and Apache lands for the settlers. Similarly, growing numbers of German settlers arrived in GSWA after the violence had marginalised the Herero (Leanza, 2020). By 1908, all surviving Hereros were forced into camps, from where they were used as forced labor, or exiled into neighboring British territories. Germans then laid claim to all Herero lands and controlled them via set of ordinances such as a native register, mandatory pass-badge, and travel permits.

Violence grew from and reflected settler designs and anxieties, their quest to claim and master the land for mining, ranching, and farming purposes, to replace the Indigenous peoples, transplant white cultures, and build prosperous settler futures in what they perceived as a vast, unfamiliar, even terrifying land. In settler eyes, the Herero, Yavapais, and Apaches were obstacles preventing settler takeover and development of the land. The events of 1864 and 1904 showcase how settler colonialism gained in intensity through extreme violence such as punitive expeditions, hangings, random shootings, destruction of villages, coordinated campaigns, battles, and pure annihilation by any means. Arguably, these extreme forms of collective violence exhibited the broader tendencies of settler colonial takeovers during of the age of global empires. Across North America, Africa, Australia, and Asia invading Europeans killed and replaced peoples who challenged their plans for domination. Settler colonial conquest was not liberation and subjugation was not betterment. Of course, this does not mean that violence prevailed everywhere, all the time. Or that it was the same everywhere. But violence was at the heart of settler histories. Replacement did not happen by itself.⁷

These settler histories remain contested around the world as shown by the Black Lives Matter movement and the calls for decolonization of Western modes of knowledge and histories. The tense rethinking of the violent colonial past in Namibia is reflected, for example, in the toppling of colonial monuments. Most prominently, the Reiterdenkmal, an equestrian statue celebrating German victory over the Herero and German settler presence on African soil, was removed by the government in 2013. Occupying a key location at the heart of the capital Windhoek, the statue, set up in 1912, celebrated settler violence for a century (Lahti, 2022). There is no comparable monument in Arizona that would specifically address the violence of the 1860s. But the wounds

remain raw as they do in Namibia. This is shown, for example, in the ongoing struggle over Oak Flat, a proposed copper mining operation that would forever demolish sacred sites of the Western Apaches. Surely, settler violence and its legacies remain unresolved in our times.

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Endnotes

¹ On Indigenous perspectives on settler violence in central Arizona, see Nancy Wright, John Sippi, and Joshu interviews, folder 34, box 3, Grenville Goodwin Papers, Arizona State Museum, Tucson.

² For eyewitness accounts, see William J. Fourr, "A Young Man's Life in the West," 190-95, file 5, box 1, William J. Fourr Papers, Arizona Historical Society, Tucson; War of the Rebellion: The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (OR), Series 1, vol. 34, part 1, 121; vol. 48, part 1, 901.

³ On Western Apache subsistence, see also Sherman Curley and Anna Price interviews, both in folder 33, box 3; Walter Hooke interview, folder 34, box 3, Goodwin Papers, Arizona State Museum, Tucson.

⁴ For accounts of these killing sprees, see "A Young Man's Life in the West" manuscript, 150-89, 202-09, 226, file 5, box 1, Fourr Papers, AHS; Timothy Braatz, *Surviving Conquest: A History of the Yavapai Peoples* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003), 82-90.

⁵ On Carleton's orders for the campaigns against the Mescaleros, Navajos, and Western Apaches, in which all he made it clear that no women or children would be killed intentionally, see OR, Series 1, vol. 15, 579-81; vol. 34, part 3, 387-89.

⁶ OR, Series 1, vol. 34, part 3, 387-89; Indian Tribes and their Treatment, US Senate Report No. 156, 39th Cong., 2d sess., Serial 1279, 172-73, 176-81.

⁷ See, for example, the "Colonial Frontier Massacres in Australia" project at <https://c21ch.newcastle.edu.au/colonialmassacres/> (accessed August 23, 2022).